Another year, another bout of unedifying squealing and squabbling about borders in the Western Balkans. This time it is two supposedly better-behaved children, Slovenia and Croatia, that are in dispute. While they have not come to blows (yet), there is much unpleasantness in the air, and the Slovenes are holding Croatian accession negotiations to the EU hostage as a result.
The argument is over the Gulf of Piran (of course, the name has now become controversial as well, with both sides arguing about what the real name should be) and the consequences of the break-up of Yugoslavia. This very clear map (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bay-of-Piran_maritime-boundary-dispute.jpg) illustrates things better than I can describe, but essentially, in Yugoslav days, ships could sail from Slovenia through Yugoslav waters and reach international waters directly. With the break up of Yugoslavia, Slovenian ships would have to sail through another country's waters in order to reach international waters.
Both sides' positions appear to have oscillated back and forth since 1990, but currently Slovenia is insisting on having about 3/4 of the bay and a corridor to international waters, while Croatia would have an "exclave" of national waters on the other side of the corridor to maintain a maritime boundary with Italy (which is apparently not allowed under international law). This is the scenario depicted in the map link above.
Even if this situation appears highly favourable to Slovenia, the two governments initialled an agreement along these lines in 2001. However, the Croatian government was unable to obtain parliamentary support for the agreement, and the process has foundered since. As often happens, positions have hardened, with Slovenia insisting on the agreement being adhered to, and Croatia going back to the 50:50 option combined with the offer of unfettered access through Croatian waters for Slovenian ships.
Looking at this objectively, and from normal international law principles, I would say that Croatia has the more reasonable case here. The fact that Slovenia does not want to take this to legal arbitration suggests that they know this.
However, the Croatian position is weakened by the fact that their Prime Minister initialled the agreement in 2001 to hand over most of the bay to Slovenia. More fundamentally, the realpolitik means that Slovenia holds the upper hand as they are already in the EU and NATO and can block Croatian accession. Maybe one compromise option would be to go back to a 50:50 split of the bay but to combine that with a corridor for Slovenian shipping. Unfortunately, at the moment, compromise is not a word that is in wide circulation.
About
Everyday tales and stories from the border regions of Europe and beyond, with the aim of explaining why we border-crossers are as obsessed as we are about this subject, why it is important to all of us, and why the co-operation community needs a little bit more visibility than it normally gets.
Wednesday, 25 February 2009
Sunday, 22 February 2009
Headless chickens?
A very short, minor modifying decision was quietly eased out by the European Commission on Wednesday. Nothing so unusual about that, you might think. Happens all the time. However, this decision was unusual, by anyone's standards.
The decision increased the amount of closure flexibility for 2000-2006 Structural Funds programmes from 2% to 10%. To explain a little: Structural Fund programmes are divided into priorities and the amount of money available in each priority is fixed. It could be modified up to 2006 but not after. The closure flexibility allows programmes which have slightly overspent in one priority to be able to claim that overspend from the Commission, provided it is balanced with an underspend in another priority.
Of course, the word "slightly" was only appropriate when the flexibility was 2%. With the new decision allowing five times that amount, the correct adverb is now " massively". The 2% flexibility was fair - projects inside priorities often underspend, and well managed programmes will budget for this by slightly (that word again) overcommitting funds per priority. A 10% flexibility basically allows extremely poorly managed programmes to cover huge spending gaps in their finances and drives a coach and horses through any kind of attempt to ensure sound financial management.
More worryingly, the whole saga seems to suggest that the Commission has lost a degree of its independence vis-a-vis the Member States. The Commission is supposed to be the guardian of the treaties - not the bender of rules to assist incompetent Member States to recover funds. It fits into a wider pattern, with the current comprehensive revision exercise on the Structural Funds regulations being carried out in the name of the world financial crisis when it has nothing to do with that at all - as can be seen by some of the proposed changes being pushed by the Member States. Someone, somewhere needs to lift their head up from the short-term and look at the medium- and long-term damage being done to cohesion policy through incessant tinkering with rules and kow-towing to Member State demands.
The decision increased the amount of closure flexibility for 2000-2006 Structural Funds programmes from 2% to 10%. To explain a little: Structural Fund programmes are divided into priorities and the amount of money available in each priority is fixed. It could be modified up to 2006 but not after. The closure flexibility allows programmes which have slightly overspent in one priority to be able to claim that overspend from the Commission, provided it is balanced with an underspend in another priority.
Of course, the word "slightly" was only appropriate when the flexibility was 2%. With the new decision allowing five times that amount, the correct adverb is now " massively". The 2% flexibility was fair - projects inside priorities often underspend, and well managed programmes will budget for this by slightly (that word again) overcommitting funds per priority. A 10% flexibility basically allows extremely poorly managed programmes to cover huge spending gaps in their finances and drives a coach and horses through any kind of attempt to ensure sound financial management.
More worryingly, the whole saga seems to suggest that the Commission has lost a degree of its independence vis-a-vis the Member States. The Commission is supposed to be the guardian of the treaties - not the bender of rules to assist incompetent Member States to recover funds. It fits into a wider pattern, with the current comprehensive revision exercise on the Structural Funds regulations being carried out in the name of the world financial crisis when it has nothing to do with that at all - as can be seen by some of the proposed changes being pushed by the Member States. Someone, somewhere needs to lift their head up from the short-term and look at the medium- and long-term damage being done to cohesion policy through incessant tinkering with rules and kow-towing to Member State demands.
Wednesday, 11 February 2009
Progress in the Black Sea
Last week, the International Court of Justice fixed the Romania-Ukraine maritime border in the Black Sea. The dispute had festered for almost 20 years over a rocky outcrop called "Serpent Island" which, depending on whether it was designated an island or a "cliff" would impact upon where the maritime boundary would lie. It appears that the Court has leaned towards the Romanian position, although not all the way. The issue of the actual sovereignty of the island was not presented to the Court, although there are still some in Romania who want the island back from Ukraine, on the basis that it was appropriated by the Soviet Union in 1948. However, both governments seem willing to accept the ICJ decision and to consider the situation finalised.
This is good news for on-going Romania-Ukraine cross-border co-operation, but there are still issues to be addressed. The most serious would appear to be the spat about the Danube Delta and which of the channels through the delta can be used for shipping. This is often presented as an environmental argument, but there are evidently economic undertones - i.e. who gets paid for allowing ships to go through the delta. In any event, progress is required here if future co-operation on Danube issues is not to be impeded.
This is good news for on-going Romania-Ukraine cross-border co-operation, but there are still issues to be addressed. The most serious would appear to be the spat about the Danube Delta and which of the channels through the delta can be used for shipping. This is often presented as an environmental argument, but there are evidently economic undertones - i.e. who gets paid for allowing ships to go through the delta. In any event, progress is required here if future co-operation on Danube issues is not to be impeded.
Wednesday, 28 January 2009
Naughty Irish cross-border drivers
I quite enjoyed this story on the BBC this week about drivers from Ireland running up thousands of pounds in driving fines in Northern Ireland (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/7852597.stm). In fact, it's a bit cruel really - the UK economy needs every penny it can get at the moment.
Actually, the EU is trying to address this issue through the snappily-titled proposal for a "Directive facilitating cross-border enforcement in the field of road safety" (http://preview.tinyurl.com/chf7uj). In fact, the proposed Directive only covers the following at present: (a) speeding; (b) drink-driving; (c) non-use of a seat-belt; (d) failing to stop at a red traffic light and not parking fines - it's more difficult to justify bad parking as a road safety issue perhaps, although when you see the idiots that park on pedestrian crossings or in bus lanes, I think a case could be made. I am certainly surprised that using a mobile phone while driving is not on the list: that is clearly a safety issue.
I can see the road lobby moaning vociferously about this, but the Border-Crosser has very little sympathy - why should you be allowed to drive badly with impunity just because you live across the border? After all, there's an even easier way of avoiding a fine - don't break the law.
Actually, the EU is trying to address this issue through the snappily-titled proposal for a "Directive facilitating cross-border enforcement in the field of road safety" (http://preview.tinyurl.com/chf7uj). In fact, the proposed Directive only covers the following at present: (a) speeding; (b) drink-driving; (c) non-use of a seat-belt; (d) failing to stop at a red traffic light and not parking fines - it's more difficult to justify bad parking as a road safety issue perhaps, although when you see the idiots that park on pedestrian crossings or in bus lanes, I think a case could be made. I am certainly surprised that using a mobile phone while driving is not on the list: that is clearly a safety issue.
I can see the road lobby moaning vociferously about this, but the Border-Crosser has very little sympathy - why should you be allowed to drive badly with impunity just because you live across the border? After all, there's an even easier way of avoiding a fine - don't break the law.
Friday, 16 January 2009
Happy New Year - and a late Christmas present
A bit late I know, but it's been a hectic couple of months in the cross-border world. Not content with trying to get the late starters among the new 2007-2013 co-operation programmes moving, the Commission suddenly sprang a big surprise by offering 6 month extensions for the old 2000-2006 programmes which were meant to close down at the end of 2008.
This last-minute knee-jerk reaction approach is, unfortunately, too often the case with the Commission. Programmes were caught unprepared; even those that could react had mostly closed down projects anyway, so an extra 6 months does not really help project spending very much (apart from amongst those real laggards who still had projects running up to 31 December, of which there were a few.)
However, there is one key positive element to come out of all this. Programmes will now get some help in paying their closure costs. It has always seemed bizarre that expenditure eligibility finished at the end of 2008, but the deadline for closure documents was 15 months later. Certainly, it takes time for such documentation to be compiled and prepared, but who was meant to pay for the 15 months work? The Commission's answer (up to last month) of "the Member States" might be okay for national programmes, but was never a fair response for multi-country programmes. So the programme extensions should be seen as allowing some of the closure costs to be an eligible expense, and programmes should still aim to submit documents by March 2010.
Next time though, a little more warning would be nice.
This last-minute knee-jerk reaction approach is, unfortunately, too often the case with the Commission. Programmes were caught unprepared; even those that could react had mostly closed down projects anyway, so an extra 6 months does not really help project spending very much (apart from amongst those real laggards who still had projects running up to 31 December, of which there were a few.)
However, there is one key positive element to come out of all this. Programmes will now get some help in paying their closure costs. It has always seemed bizarre that expenditure eligibility finished at the end of 2008, but the deadline for closure documents was 15 months later. Certainly, it takes time for such documentation to be compiled and prepared, but who was meant to pay for the 15 months work? The Commission's answer (up to last month) of "the Member States" might be okay for national programmes, but was never a fair response for multi-country programmes. So the programme extensions should be seen as allowing some of the closure costs to be an eligible expense, and programmes should still aim to submit documents by March 2010.
Next time though, a little more warning would be nice.
Wednesday, 12 November 2008
So, just what is Territorial Cohesion?
Nope, that's not a trick question. Not content with having rebranded INTERREG as "Territorial Co-operation" for the 2007-2013 period, the EU has also come up with a concept similar in name, and not a million kilometres away in content, with "Territorial Cohesion".
Well, we think it's close in content. It's a bit difficult to tell, as the Commission has managed to issue a Green Paper on the subject without actually defining what it is (ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/consultation/terco/consultation_en.htm). In fact, the Commission seems quite proud of the fact that there is no definition and stresses that this will depend on reactions to the Green Paper.
Now there may be some twisted logic in there somewhere, but it looks an awful lot like ceding any advantage that you might have from holding the pen. If you put a definition down, no matter how weak, you force people to react to it, and comment on it. Without that framework, reactions could (and probably will) fly off in all directions.
This is especially true with this kind of topic, where every possible regional interest group sees the concept of territorial cohesion in its own narrow perspective. Expect bodies dealing with mountains, cities, rivers, rural, peripheral, island areas and others to have very different ideas about TC (as it should not be called). I suspect the Commission is going to have a tricky time prepare a cohesive summary of the public consultation.
Well, we think it's close in content. It's a bit difficult to tell, as the Commission has managed to issue a Green Paper on the subject without actually defining what it is (ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/consultation/terco/consultation_en.htm). In fact, the Commission seems quite proud of the fact that there is no definition and stresses that this will depend on reactions to the Green Paper.
Now there may be some twisted logic in there somewhere, but it looks an awful lot like ceding any advantage that you might have from holding the pen. If you put a definition down, no matter how weak, you force people to react to it, and comment on it. Without that framework, reactions could (and probably will) fly off in all directions.
This is especially true with this kind of topic, where every possible regional interest group sees the concept of territorial cohesion in its own narrow perspective. Expect bodies dealing with mountains, cities, rivers, rural, peripheral, island areas and others to have very different ideas about TC (as it should not be called). I suspect the Commission is going to have a tricky time prepare a cohesive summary of the public consultation.
Tuesday, 4 November 2008
Mexico invades USA (sort of)
With the US distracted by the general election, Mexico took the opportunity to surprise its northern neighbour and has launched an invasion of Arizona.
Of course, I may have exaggerated this story slightly - see media.www.clarksonintegrator.com/media/storage/paper280/news/2008/11/03/News/Mexican.Troops.Illegally.Cross.Border-3521894.shtml
for the accurate picture. Mind you, 42 illegal border crossings in a couple of years is quite impressive.
This reminds me of previous incidents involving the UK and Spain (www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2002/feb/19/gibraltar.world) and Liechtenstein and Switzerland (www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/mar/02/markoliver).
It's good to know that there are so many armies wandering the globe who are fans of INTERREG and co-operation. After all, we don't like the artificial restrictions borders create either.
Of course, I may have exaggerated this story slightly - see media.www.clarksonintegrator.com/media/storage/paper280/news/2008/11/03/News/Mexican.Troops.Illegally.Cross.Border-3521894.shtml
for the accurate picture. Mind you, 42 illegal border crossings in a couple of years is quite impressive.
This reminds me of previous incidents involving the UK and Spain (www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2002/feb/19/gibraltar.world) and Liechtenstein and Switzerland (www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/mar/02/markoliver).
It's good to know that there are so many armies wandering the globe who are fans of INTERREG and co-operation. After all, we don't like the artificial restrictions borders create either.
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