It's evidently Strategy time on the Tales from the Borderlands blog, as today the Baltic Sea takes centre stage. The Finns, in their usual quiet, effective way, put together the Baltic Sea Action Summit (http://www.bsas.fi/) which took place last Wednesday. The guest list was truly impressive, with at least 3 Presidents, 5 Prime Ministers (including Putin), not to mention the Swedish King, accompanied by his environment minister.
Also taking part was the new European Commissioner for Regional Policy, Johannes Hahn. I can't help thinking that President Barroso should really have been there as well. Yes, there is the very good explanation that 10 February was the first day of work for the new Commission, but - if the event had been covering the south of Europe, do we still think Barroso would not have been present?
On content, there were strong messages from all participants, demonstrating a genuine commitment to cleaning up the Baltic. The Border-crosser is not often considered an idealist, so here's hoping that my feeling - that a lot of what was said went further than is normally the case - is accurate. There will be a need to link up many of the individual commitments to the EU's Baltic Sea Strategy, and also to the HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan, but that looks doable.
The one off-note of the day came from Putin, who delivered a longish lecture about how wonderful the Nordstream gas pipeline is going to be for the Baltic environment. He was a little short on proof for backing that up, unsurprisingly, but his very presence was still a positive signal, and he had a whole series of bilateral meetings in the margins which can only have helped as well.
Showing posts with label Baltic. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Baltic. Show all posts
Tuesday, 16 February 2010
Wednesday, 10 June 2009
A Baltic Strategy
The Commission will today publish its Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region which is aimed at providing the region with a policy framework delivering better results for the EU citizen.
Why the Baltic? Well, on one level it's an obvious choice. The institutional system in the region is packed with international and interregional organisations, like the Nordic Council, the CBSS, HELCOM, the BSSSC, the UBC, the BEAC and a whole host of other acronyms. Indeed, you might ask, if the Baltic is so good at being organised across national borders, why does it need a strategy at all?
The answer is twofold. Firstly, having so many organisations in one region can be a disadvantage when it comes to agreeing on actual action. All these organisations have slightly different focuses, subtly different priorities. Getting them all pulling in the same direction at the same time is none too easy.
The second issue is often a consequence of the first. Since it is difficult to get everyone to agree on a joint approach, it is all too common that the discussions do not lead to sufficient action on the ground. And this is what has been seen in the Baltic. For all the talk and broad, political agreement, the environmental state of the Baltic Sea itself keeps worsening, the transport links do not improve sufficiently quickly, and economic development is still divergent.
The Baltic Sea Strategy offers the chance to better co-ordinate what is already in place and to guide future co-operation work more effectively - in short, to provide the overall framework into which actions and projects can be fitted and organised coherently.
Boiled down to these basics, it's a remarkably straightforward and sensible idea. The uncharitable might ask why it took so long to get around to it, but the role of the Commission in the process provides the response to that. The Member States were unable to come up with this together and needed the Commission as an impartial player to take the lead role in co-ordinating the work. In this, it can be seen as an expansion of the role the Commission often plays in the cross-border programmes in the region. And it could be the start of something much bigger - other regions in Europe are watching with much interest.
Why the Baltic? Well, on one level it's an obvious choice. The institutional system in the region is packed with international and interregional organisations, like the Nordic Council, the CBSS, HELCOM, the BSSSC, the UBC, the BEAC and a whole host of other acronyms. Indeed, you might ask, if the Baltic is so good at being organised across national borders, why does it need a strategy at all?
The answer is twofold. Firstly, having so many organisations in one region can be a disadvantage when it comes to agreeing on actual action. All these organisations have slightly different focuses, subtly different priorities. Getting them all pulling in the same direction at the same time is none too easy.
The second issue is often a consequence of the first. Since it is difficult to get everyone to agree on a joint approach, it is all too common that the discussions do not lead to sufficient action on the ground. And this is what has been seen in the Baltic. For all the talk and broad, political agreement, the environmental state of the Baltic Sea itself keeps worsening, the transport links do not improve sufficiently quickly, and economic development is still divergent.
The Baltic Sea Strategy offers the chance to better co-ordinate what is already in place and to guide future co-operation work more effectively - in short, to provide the overall framework into which actions and projects can be fitted and organised coherently.
Boiled down to these basics, it's a remarkably straightforward and sensible idea. The uncharitable might ask why it took so long to get around to it, but the role of the Commission in the process provides the response to that. The Member States were unable to come up with this together and needed the Commission as an impartial player to take the lead role in co-ordinating the work. In this, it can be seen as an expansion of the role the Commission often plays in the cross-border programmes in the region. And it could be the start of something much bigger - other regions in Europe are watching with much interest.
Wednesday, 26 March 2008
Into the Baltic
The South Baltic cross-border programme is having its launch event today in Gdansk, which is a good a reason as any to take a closer look. It's a brand new programme, created as a result of the expanded approach to maritime cross-border co-operation (anything up to 150km). Even then, the programme wouldn't exist if the island of Bornholm was not conveniently located just under 150km from almost everywhere.
This results in a five country cross-border programme, which is almost a contradiction in terms in itself, stretching across the whole southern Baltic Sea. It involves Sweden, Poland, Denmark, Lithuania and Germany (in roughly that order of enthusiasm). The Swedes were so delighted to get support for the programme that they were happy to let the Poles manage it: the Poles seem to want to manage every co-operation programmes they are involved in.
To be fair, the programme has made a good start. To be even fairer, the advantage of Poland managing so many co-operation programmes is that they are actually rather good at it, and have put in plenty of resources to get this programme moving forward. Consequently, despite the complexity of the partnership, and the fact that it is completely new, the programme is at the same stage of implementation as many more experienced programmes.
Having said all that, I still have my doubts. Maritime co-operation, by its nature, is not the same as land-based cross-border co-operation. Even close maritime co-operation is different, although it has sufficient similarities with terrestrial co-operation that it can be justified (and has been shown to work in some places). But cross-border co-operation across the southern Baltic? This is most of the way towards transnational co-operation, which is a very different kettle of fish.
It will be interesting to see the results that come from the South Baltic and how cross-border they truly are. On one level, it may not seem to matter much - once eligibility for cross-border co-operation is achieved, it is unlikely to be taken away at a programme level, no matter what the results (witness Greece-Cyprus for an example). But, on a higher level, too many poor or uninspiring results in too many programmes, and people could start to question the whole cross-border co-operation policy. And that would be a heavy price to pay for allowing long-distance maritime co-operation as a political compromise.
This results in a five country cross-border programme, which is almost a contradiction in terms in itself, stretching across the whole southern Baltic Sea. It involves Sweden, Poland, Denmark, Lithuania and Germany (in roughly that order of enthusiasm). The Swedes were so delighted to get support for the programme that they were happy to let the Poles manage it: the Poles seem to want to manage every co-operation programmes they are involved in.
To be fair, the programme has made a good start. To be even fairer, the advantage of Poland managing so many co-operation programmes is that they are actually rather good at it, and have put in plenty of resources to get this programme moving forward. Consequently, despite the complexity of the partnership, and the fact that it is completely new, the programme is at the same stage of implementation as many more experienced programmes.
Having said all that, I still have my doubts. Maritime co-operation, by its nature, is not the same as land-based cross-border co-operation. Even close maritime co-operation is different, although it has sufficient similarities with terrestrial co-operation that it can be justified (and has been shown to work in some places). But cross-border co-operation across the southern Baltic? This is most of the way towards transnational co-operation, which is a very different kettle of fish.
It will be interesting to see the results that come from the South Baltic and how cross-border they truly are. On one level, it may not seem to matter much - once eligibility for cross-border co-operation is achieved, it is unlikely to be taken away at a programme level, no matter what the results (witness Greece-Cyprus for an example). But, on a higher level, too many poor or uninspiring results in too many programmes, and people could start to question the whole cross-border co-operation policy. And that would be a heavy price to pay for allowing long-distance maritime co-operation as a political compromise.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)