Regular readers will notice that the Border-crosser has been on an extended break recently, but, in some areas at least, it is as if he hasn't been away at all. Slovenia and Croatia continue to drift along in mutual incomprehension, despite a fairly determined effort by the Commission to haul them back to their senses.
The post below (25 Feb) sets out the background to this dispute, but it is the on-going intransigence which is perhaps the saddest part of the story. We all know the recent history of the Western Balkans and the dangers involved in inflaming nationalist sentiments. If ever there was a need for cool heads and a dedramatising of the situation, then this is it. And yet, we get the exact opposite: consider this scary article http://www.javno.com/en-world/mp-zmago-calls-serbia-bosnia-against-croatia_262530
"Then weapons will fire"?? Have we learned nothing? The answer, apparently, is no.
Showing posts with label balkans. Show all posts
Showing posts with label balkans. Show all posts
Wednesday, 3 June 2009
Wednesday, 25 February 2009
Squabbling in the Balkans
Another year, another bout of unedifying squealing and squabbling about borders in the Western Balkans. This time it is two supposedly better-behaved children, Slovenia and Croatia, that are in dispute. While they have not come to blows (yet), there is much unpleasantness in the air, and the Slovenes are holding Croatian accession negotiations to the EU hostage as a result.
The argument is over the Gulf of Piran (of course, the name has now become controversial as well, with both sides arguing about what the real name should be) and the consequences of the break-up of Yugoslavia. This very clear map (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bay-of-Piran_maritime-boundary-dispute.jpg) illustrates things better than I can describe, but essentially, in Yugoslav days, ships could sail from Slovenia through Yugoslav waters and reach international waters directly. With the break up of Yugoslavia, Slovenian ships would have to sail through another country's waters in order to reach international waters.
Both sides' positions appear to have oscillated back and forth since 1990, but currently Slovenia is insisting on having about 3/4 of the bay and a corridor to international waters, while Croatia would have an "exclave" of national waters on the other side of the corridor to maintain a maritime boundary with Italy (which is apparently not allowed under international law). This is the scenario depicted in the map link above.
Even if this situation appears highly favourable to Slovenia, the two governments initialled an agreement along these lines in 2001. However, the Croatian government was unable to obtain parliamentary support for the agreement, and the process has foundered since. As often happens, positions have hardened, with Slovenia insisting on the agreement being adhered to, and Croatia going back to the 50:50 option combined with the offer of unfettered access through Croatian waters for Slovenian ships.
Looking at this objectively, and from normal international law principles, I would say that Croatia has the more reasonable case here. The fact that Slovenia does not want to take this to legal arbitration suggests that they know this.
However, the Croatian position is weakened by the fact that their Prime Minister initialled the agreement in 2001 to hand over most of the bay to Slovenia. More fundamentally, the realpolitik means that Slovenia holds the upper hand as they are already in the EU and NATO and can block Croatian accession. Maybe one compromise option would be to go back to a 50:50 split of the bay but to combine that with a corridor for Slovenian shipping. Unfortunately, at the moment, compromise is not a word that is in wide circulation.
The argument is over the Gulf of Piran (of course, the name has now become controversial as well, with both sides arguing about what the real name should be) and the consequences of the break-up of Yugoslavia. This very clear map (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bay-of-Piran_maritime-boundary-dispute.jpg) illustrates things better than I can describe, but essentially, in Yugoslav days, ships could sail from Slovenia through Yugoslav waters and reach international waters directly. With the break up of Yugoslavia, Slovenian ships would have to sail through another country's waters in order to reach international waters.
Both sides' positions appear to have oscillated back and forth since 1990, but currently Slovenia is insisting on having about 3/4 of the bay and a corridor to international waters, while Croatia would have an "exclave" of national waters on the other side of the corridor to maintain a maritime boundary with Italy (which is apparently not allowed under international law). This is the scenario depicted in the map link above.
Even if this situation appears highly favourable to Slovenia, the two governments initialled an agreement along these lines in 2001. However, the Croatian government was unable to obtain parliamentary support for the agreement, and the process has foundered since. As often happens, positions have hardened, with Slovenia insisting on the agreement being adhered to, and Croatia going back to the 50:50 option combined with the offer of unfettered access through Croatian waters for Slovenian ships.
Looking at this objectively, and from normal international law principles, I would say that Croatia has the more reasonable case here. The fact that Slovenia does not want to take this to legal arbitration suggests that they know this.
However, the Croatian position is weakened by the fact that their Prime Minister initialled the agreement in 2001 to hand over most of the bay to Slovenia. More fundamentally, the realpolitik means that Slovenia holds the upper hand as they are already in the EU and NATO and can block Croatian accession. Maybe one compromise option would be to go back to a 50:50 split of the bay but to combine that with a corridor for Slovenian shipping. Unfortunately, at the moment, compromise is not a word that is in wide circulation.
Saturday, 30 August 2008
Project Record for South-East Europe
A number of the new co-operation programmes have evidently been worried about receiving very high numbers of project applications, causing much work for programme staff, and much disappointment for applicants, with all programmes having limited budgets. This has resulted in some programmes adopting a two stage process, with expressions of interest as a first step, and then full applications being invited from a limited number of projects only.
This is a good strategy on paper, but it does run a major risk - as expressions of interest (EoIs) are easier to write, there could be a lot more of them, as applicants think that there is nothing to lose at that stage. And so it seems to have proved.
First up was the new Mediterranean programme, which received a massive 531 EoIs in response to its first call. A month or so later, this was smashed by the South-East Europe programme, which set a new record of a frankly quite terrifying 821 EoIs. The Border Crosser is very glad not to be working in the programme secretariat.
All of this is, of course, good news. There is clearly enormous interest in co-operation across most of Europe. The South-East figures were especially good if you consider 1 in 4 of the 5,400 partners in the submissions came from outside the Union, and 1 in 3 of those came from Serbia. They really are so co-operative down there.
Of course, the real test will be on project quality and how relevant the content actually proves to be. But that is for later on. Now, anyone going to beat 821?
This is a good strategy on paper, but it does run a major risk - as expressions of interest (EoIs) are easier to write, there could be a lot more of them, as applicants think that there is nothing to lose at that stage. And so it seems to have proved.
First up was the new Mediterranean programme, which received a massive 531 EoIs in response to its first call. A month or so later, this was smashed by the South-East Europe programme, which set a new record of a frankly quite terrifying 821 EoIs. The Border Crosser is very glad not to be working in the programme secretariat.
All of this is, of course, good news. There is clearly enormous interest in co-operation across most of Europe. The South-East figures were especially good if you consider 1 in 4 of the 5,400 partners in the submissions came from outside the Union, and 1 in 3 of those came from Serbia. They really are so co-operative down there.
Of course, the real test will be on project quality and how relevant the content actually proves to be. But that is for later on. Now, anyone going to beat 821?
Thursday, 6 March 2008
A Serbian Paradox
What with everything that is happening at the moment (the Border-Crosser drafts neutrally), you might imagine that Serbia would be feeling less than enamoured with the European Union and all its constituent parts at the moment. And in general, you would be right. Lots of bellicose noise is coming out of Prime Minister Kostunica and company, and there are threats of refusing to work with the EU at all.
Any yet, next week will see a cross-border conference in the middle of Belgrade, organised by the Serbian government, celebrating the Neighbourhood Programmes (“Serbia’s Success Stories”) and looking forward to the new cross-border programmes for 2007-2013. So what’s going on?
In all probability, a number of things. Firstly, a majority of Serbs realise that they do need to keep working with Europe and that they do need to get on with their neighbours, regardless of their disagreements over the future of Kosovo. Secondly, the EU considers that engagement with Serbia remains vital for the region as a whole, and all good news stories must be encouraged (see the EU’s latest Western Balkans Communication from 5 March: ec.europa.eu/enlargement/balkans_communication/index_en.htm); and thirdly, there is a key team of Serbian officials who have been driving the cross-border agenda forward in recent years since they have recognised the potential and added value of this co-operation for their country.
This group of people have a difficult task in the current climate. I wish them well.
Any yet, next week will see a cross-border conference in the middle of Belgrade, organised by the Serbian government, celebrating the Neighbourhood Programmes (“Serbia’s Success Stories”) and looking forward to the new cross-border programmes for 2007-2013. So what’s going on?
In all probability, a number of things. Firstly, a majority of Serbs realise that they do need to keep working with Europe and that they do need to get on with their neighbours, regardless of their disagreements over the future of Kosovo. Secondly, the EU considers that engagement with Serbia remains vital for the region as a whole, and all good news stories must be encouraged (see the EU’s latest Western Balkans Communication from 5 March: ec.europa.eu/enlargement/balkans_communication/index_en.htm); and thirdly, there is a key team of Serbian officials who have been driving the cross-border agenda forward in recent years since they have recognised the potential and added value of this co-operation for their country.
This group of people have a difficult task in the current climate. I wish them well.
Monday, 3 March 2008
The hidden borders of Europe
Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence has sparked off further tensions elsewhere is Europe. Kosovo's supporters claim that Kosovo is a unique case, that the attempted genocide by Serbia in the late 1990s meant Serbia had lost all moral authority, and that Kosovan independence has no impact on frozen conflicts elsewhere in Europe. Russia and Serbia argue the opposite, and even have support from within the European Union, with countries like Spain, Cyprus, Romania and Slovakia all concerned about the precedent being established in Pristina.
In truth, both sides are being disingenuous. A unilateral declaration by a region or province of a country, without that country's consent, could obviously trigger parallel declarations (in fact, other declarations have been made years ago, without the level of recognition that Kosovo has already achieved). Equally, however, the only way something similar could happen in Abkhazia or South Ossetia, for example, is with full Russian backing – so the only way it becomes a precedent in these cases is if Russia wants it to become a precedent.
There are 6 principal areas of concern across Europe where the Kosovo situation is being watched very closely: the already mentioned Abhkazia and South Ossetia; Transnistria; Nagorno Karabakh; Republika Srpska; and northern Cyprus. (For a perspective from further away, see the Sri Lanka news story on the right-hand side.)
The first three cases are linked directly to Moscow – no-one is going to recognise these countries as independent unless Moscow does. Moscow is perfectly happy to keep all three territories hanging since it keeps them dependent, and gives Moscow leverage against Georgia and Moldova.
Nagorno Karabakh is occupied by Armenia; Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh are in positions of power in Yerevan – yet, even Armenia has not recognised Nagorno-Karabakh's declaration of independence. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have been spending very large sums on defence equipment (or, rather, attack equipment) and this is one area where the conflict could unfreeze rapidly.
Northern Cyprus has also declared its independence many years ago, but is recognised only by Turkey. The recent Cypriot presidential elections seem to have opened a possibility of resuming talks on the future of the island, and there are some hopes here. The Cypriot government's strong reaction on Kosovo's declaration is evidently directly linked to concerns that it strengthens the UDI of northern Cyprus. Again, this seems overblown, as no-one else is planning to recognise the UDI.
Republika Srpska is, of course, particularly problematic given the Serbian ethnic links. Demonstrations have already taken place in Banja Luka against Kosovan independence. If Srpska wants to declare independence on the basis of a referendum, how and why would this be different from Kosovo? Territorial integrity must apply to Bosnia, but must not apply to Serbia? This is a fundamental weak link in the argument of those who recognise Kosovan independence.
Of course, one further area where the Kosovan situation has an immediate impact is – northern Kosovo. If the majority population around Mitrovica says that it wants to be part of Serbia, why should Kosovan territorial integrity count for any more than the Serbian equivalent has done? Here, I think, we will actually see something happening in the short term, for the simple reason that Pristina’s writ will be unenforceable north of the Ibar, and Mitrovica et al will continue, de facto, to be linked to Belgrade.
In truth, both sides are being disingenuous. A unilateral declaration by a region or province of a country, without that country's consent, could obviously trigger parallel declarations (in fact, other declarations have been made years ago, without the level of recognition that Kosovo has already achieved). Equally, however, the only way something similar could happen in Abkhazia or South Ossetia, for example, is with full Russian backing – so the only way it becomes a precedent in these cases is if Russia wants it to become a precedent.
There are 6 principal areas of concern across Europe where the Kosovo situation is being watched very closely: the already mentioned Abhkazia and South Ossetia; Transnistria; Nagorno Karabakh; Republika Srpska; and northern Cyprus. (For a perspective from further away, see the Sri Lanka news story on the right-hand side.)
The first three cases are linked directly to Moscow – no-one is going to recognise these countries as independent unless Moscow does. Moscow is perfectly happy to keep all three territories hanging since it keeps them dependent, and gives Moscow leverage against Georgia and Moldova.
Nagorno Karabakh is occupied by Armenia; Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh are in positions of power in Yerevan – yet, even Armenia has not recognised Nagorno-Karabakh's declaration of independence. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have been spending very large sums on defence equipment (or, rather, attack equipment) and this is one area where the conflict could unfreeze rapidly.
Northern Cyprus has also declared its independence many years ago, but is recognised only by Turkey. The recent Cypriot presidential elections seem to have opened a possibility of resuming talks on the future of the island, and there are some hopes here. The Cypriot government's strong reaction on Kosovo's declaration is evidently directly linked to concerns that it strengthens the UDI of northern Cyprus. Again, this seems overblown, as no-one else is planning to recognise the UDI.
Republika Srpska is, of course, particularly problematic given the Serbian ethnic links. Demonstrations have already taken place in Banja Luka against Kosovan independence. If Srpska wants to declare independence on the basis of a referendum, how and why would this be different from Kosovo? Territorial integrity must apply to Bosnia, but must not apply to Serbia? This is a fundamental weak link in the argument of those who recognise Kosovan independence.
Of course, one further area where the Kosovan situation has an immediate impact is – northern Kosovo. If the majority population around Mitrovica says that it wants to be part of Serbia, why should Kosovan territorial integrity count for any more than the Serbian equivalent has done? Here, I think, we will actually see something happening in the short term, for the simple reason that Pristina’s writ will be unenforceable north of the Ibar, and Mitrovica et al will continue, de facto, to be linked to Belgrade.
Tuesday, 26 February 2008
New borders, no borders
One of the results of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence is the creation of a number of new borders in the Western Balkans – or so say some. On the other hand, Serbia and Russia claim that no new borders have been created, since the declaration was illegal and does not create a new state.
Of course, the debate is not being presented in terms of the number of borders created or not, but that is one of the effects, and it is worth looking at the impact this could have. Macedonia's northern border is split in two, half Kosovar, half Serbian. The Serbian border with Albania becomes a Kosovo-Albania border entirely; and even the border with Montenegro is affected, with a short stretch now being between Kosovo and Montenegro. All of this is without even mentioning the long Serbia-Kosovo border which is now in de facto existence – not withstanding the rapid Serbian efforts to burn down some of the border posts.
Given this blog's focus on cross-border co-operation issues, what are the possibilities of encouraging such activity on these "new" borders? Well, it is clear that the very opposite of co-operation is going to happen along the Serbia-Kosovo border for the foreseeable future. But what of the others? It is likely that Albania and Kosovo will be keen to work together fairly quickly, but perhaps the most complicated case of all could be the Macedonian border. Macedonia, already suffering political issues on its southern border (this blog considers a country can call itself what it wants, so we will not be using the "former Yugoslav Republic…" terminology), will now face real problems on its northern borders. It will be keen to work with Serbia on the one hand, while especially the ethnic Albanian population will want to work with Kosovo. However, working with Kosovo could well lead to sanctions or boycotts from Serbia, thus undermining both possible co-operations.
Evidently, cross-border co-operation is not the first thing in peoples' minds at the moment. Nevertheless, the benefits of such contacts should not be underestimated in helping to reduce tensions in such difficult situations. Therefore, it is probably worth watching how events develop in the short to medium-term, and then taking careful steps to start cross-border links where possible.
Of course, the debate is not being presented in terms of the number of borders created or not, but that is one of the effects, and it is worth looking at the impact this could have. Macedonia's northern border is split in two, half Kosovar, half Serbian. The Serbian border with Albania becomes a Kosovo-Albania border entirely; and even the border with Montenegro is affected, with a short stretch now being between Kosovo and Montenegro. All of this is without even mentioning the long Serbia-Kosovo border which is now in de facto existence – not withstanding the rapid Serbian efforts to burn down some of the border posts.
Given this blog's focus on cross-border co-operation issues, what are the possibilities of encouraging such activity on these "new" borders? Well, it is clear that the very opposite of co-operation is going to happen along the Serbia-Kosovo border for the foreseeable future. But what of the others? It is likely that Albania and Kosovo will be keen to work together fairly quickly, but perhaps the most complicated case of all could be the Macedonian border. Macedonia, already suffering political issues on its southern border (this blog considers a country can call itself what it wants, so we will not be using the "former Yugoslav Republic…" terminology), will now face real problems on its northern borders. It will be keen to work with Serbia on the one hand, while especially the ethnic Albanian population will want to work with Kosovo. However, working with Kosovo could well lead to sanctions or boycotts from Serbia, thus undermining both possible co-operations.
Evidently, cross-border co-operation is not the first thing in peoples' minds at the moment. Nevertheless, the benefits of such contacts should not be underestimated in helping to reduce tensions in such difficult situations. Therefore, it is probably worth watching how events develop in the short to medium-term, and then taking careful steps to start cross-border links where possible.
Wednesday, 22 August 2007
Getting Balkan with it
I noticed that, when the forest fires were threatening Dubrovnik a week or so back (see 9 August news story opposite), the Croatian government was moaning that they had not received enough assistance from their neighbours. Hmm, I thought to myself, do they mean cross-border assistance? What a good idea!
Indeed, co-operation among emergency services is a particularly appropriate issue for cross-border actions. The mechanics of it are perhaps more complicated than first appears (e.g. drive a fire engine over the border, put out the fire, go home). There are issues related to insurance, accident protection, health coverage which cause potential problems (not to mention the minefields still in place along some borders).
The Council of Europe has been taking forward a regional agreement between the South-East Europe countries on mutual assistance in the event of disasters occurring in border areas which should create a solid framework for enabling this co-operation. However, as is often the case, only close long-term contacts, built up over a period of time, will enable organisations and people to work together effectively. For this, regular meetings, planning events, co-ordination seminars will need to be organised. Cross-border co-operation is occasionally criticised for being a talking shop - but how else do we learn from each other and share knowledge and ideas?
Sometimes, it's good to talk.
Indeed, co-operation among emergency services is a particularly appropriate issue for cross-border actions. The mechanics of it are perhaps more complicated than first appears (e.g. drive a fire engine over the border, put out the fire, go home). There are issues related to insurance, accident protection, health coverage which cause potential problems (not to mention the minefields still in place along some borders).
The Council of Europe has been taking forward a regional agreement between the South-East Europe countries on mutual assistance in the event of disasters occurring in border areas which should create a solid framework for enabling this co-operation. However, as is often the case, only close long-term contacts, built up over a period of time, will enable organisations and people to work together effectively. For this, regular meetings, planning events, co-ordination seminars will need to be organised. Cross-border co-operation is occasionally criticised for being a talking shop - but how else do we learn from each other and share knowledge and ideas?
Sometimes, it's good to talk.
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