If the French bits of the Caribbean are a little confusing (see previous post), at least all are an integral part of France, and all are in the European Union. The Dutch situation is another story.
The Dutch bits of the Caribbean number six in total, with Aruba having a separate status and the other 5 forming part of the Netherlands Antilles - at least at present. All are part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, but none of them are part of the EU.
Over the last few years, there has been a fairly tortuous process of discussions and voting, with a view to breaking up the Netherlands Antilles and giving the islands a new status. The trouble has been that they all want something different. Aruba was happy as it was; Sint Maarten and Curacao wanted autonomy within the Netherlands; Saba and Bonaire voted for closer ties to the Netherlands, and Sint Eustatius voted to stay within the Netherlands Antilles - which was going to prove difficult, since no-one else did.
Anyway, there appears to be the makings of a deal, although its implementation has been postponed again from the end of this year to a, as yet, undefined date. Sint Maarten and Curacao would get autonomy, and the other 3 would get the status of special municipalities.
What particularly interests us here is that the Dutch government is keen for some or all of the islands to become part of the EU and qualify as "outermost regions" like the 5 French territories mentioned in the previous post. This opens up the possibility of Cohesion Policy funding, and especially co-operation funding. This can only be good news, as it would mean the EU's "Caraibes" co-operation programme would have 2 Member States involved, and it would be much less of a Franco-French shouting match.
Saturday, 28 June 2008
Friday, 27 June 2008
Down on the Spanish (or rather the French) Main
The Border-Crosser is drifting through the Caribbean at present. There are 5 integral parts of Europe out here: Martinique, Guadeloupe, French Guiana, St Martin and St Barthelemy. All 5 are part of France: the first 3 are overseas departments, and the last two are overseas collectivities.
St Martin is the most westerly part of the European Union (good quiz tip here). Its status as a collectivity (or COM) is very new - previously it was considered a commune of Guadeloupe. The French St Martin is also unique as it shares the island of St Martin with the Dutch "island area" of Sint Maarten and therefore has a land border with the Netherlands (therein lies another good quiz question about walking from France to the Netherlands without going through Belgium).
The 5 parts of France are all part of the Caraibes co-operation programme (see www.interreg-caraibes.org). This is one of those strange co-operation programmes involving only one Member State, but with a myriad of non-Member States also taking part to some extent. Cohesion funding is only available for the Member State territory (although there is now a 10% flexibility for spending outside the Union), so there are some complicated manoeuvrings to get some degree of access to European Development Funds (EDF - not to be confused with ERDF, which is a Structural Fund for regional development) for the non-Member State islands.
It is a pity that the co-ordination issues are so challenging, as there is a real need for some basic level co-operation on transport (air and maritime), communications, disaster management and environmental issues. It would be nice to think that a fully integrated Caribbean fund could be set up to address these points - but don't hold your breath.
St Martin is the most westerly part of the European Union (good quiz tip here). Its status as a collectivity (or COM) is very new - previously it was considered a commune of Guadeloupe. The French St Martin is also unique as it shares the island of St Martin with the Dutch "island area" of Sint Maarten and therefore has a land border with the Netherlands (therein lies another good quiz question about walking from France to the Netherlands without going through Belgium).
The 5 parts of France are all part of the Caraibes co-operation programme (see www.interreg-caraibes.org). This is one of those strange co-operation programmes involving only one Member State, but with a myriad of non-Member States also taking part to some extent. Cohesion funding is only available for the Member State territory (although there is now a 10% flexibility for spending outside the Union), so there are some complicated manoeuvrings to get some degree of access to European Development Funds (EDF - not to be confused with ERDF, which is a Structural Fund for regional development) for the non-Member State islands.
It is a pity that the co-ordination issues are so challenging, as there is a real need for some basic level co-operation on transport (air and maritime), communications, disaster management and environmental issues. It would be nice to think that a fully integrated Caribbean fund could be set up to address these points - but don't hold your breath.
Sunday, 22 June 2008
The difficulties of blogging
It's not that I don't have anything to say. I might not have anything interesting to say - that's for you to judge more. But I do have things to say. I just don't find the time to write. However, there is not much point of a blog if the writer doesn't blog. So, I'll try and find the time from now. Let's see how we do.
Wednesday, 26 March 2008
Into the Baltic
The South Baltic cross-border programme is having its launch event today in Gdansk, which is a good a reason as any to take a closer look. It's a brand new programme, created as a result of the expanded approach to maritime cross-border co-operation (anything up to 150km). Even then, the programme wouldn't exist if the island of Bornholm was not conveniently located just under 150km from almost everywhere.
This results in a five country cross-border programme, which is almost a contradiction in terms in itself, stretching across the whole southern Baltic Sea. It involves Sweden, Poland, Denmark, Lithuania and Germany (in roughly that order of enthusiasm). The Swedes were so delighted to get support for the programme that they were happy to let the Poles manage it: the Poles seem to want to manage every co-operation programmes they are involved in.
To be fair, the programme has made a good start. To be even fairer, the advantage of Poland managing so many co-operation programmes is that they are actually rather good at it, and have put in plenty of resources to get this programme moving forward. Consequently, despite the complexity of the partnership, and the fact that it is completely new, the programme is at the same stage of implementation as many more experienced programmes.
Having said all that, I still have my doubts. Maritime co-operation, by its nature, is not the same as land-based cross-border co-operation. Even close maritime co-operation is different, although it has sufficient similarities with terrestrial co-operation that it can be justified (and has been shown to work in some places). But cross-border co-operation across the southern Baltic? This is most of the way towards transnational co-operation, which is a very different kettle of fish.
It will be interesting to see the results that come from the South Baltic and how cross-border they truly are. On one level, it may not seem to matter much - once eligibility for cross-border co-operation is achieved, it is unlikely to be taken away at a programme level, no matter what the results (witness Greece-Cyprus for an example). But, on a higher level, too many poor or uninspiring results in too many programmes, and people could start to question the whole cross-border co-operation policy. And that would be a heavy price to pay for allowing long-distance maritime co-operation as a political compromise.
This results in a five country cross-border programme, which is almost a contradiction in terms in itself, stretching across the whole southern Baltic Sea. It involves Sweden, Poland, Denmark, Lithuania and Germany (in roughly that order of enthusiasm). The Swedes were so delighted to get support for the programme that they were happy to let the Poles manage it: the Poles seem to want to manage every co-operation programmes they are involved in.
To be fair, the programme has made a good start. To be even fairer, the advantage of Poland managing so many co-operation programmes is that they are actually rather good at it, and have put in plenty of resources to get this programme moving forward. Consequently, despite the complexity of the partnership, and the fact that it is completely new, the programme is at the same stage of implementation as many more experienced programmes.
Having said all that, I still have my doubts. Maritime co-operation, by its nature, is not the same as land-based cross-border co-operation. Even close maritime co-operation is different, although it has sufficient similarities with terrestrial co-operation that it can be justified (and has been shown to work in some places). But cross-border co-operation across the southern Baltic? This is most of the way towards transnational co-operation, which is a very different kettle of fish.
It will be interesting to see the results that come from the South Baltic and how cross-border they truly are. On one level, it may not seem to matter much - once eligibility for cross-border co-operation is achieved, it is unlikely to be taken away at a programme level, no matter what the results (witness Greece-Cyprus for an example). But, on a higher level, too many poor or uninspiring results in too many programmes, and people could start to question the whole cross-border co-operation policy. And that would be a heavy price to pay for allowing long-distance maritime co-operation as a political compromise.
Thursday, 6 March 2008
A Serbian Paradox
What with everything that is happening at the moment (the Border-Crosser drafts neutrally), you might imagine that Serbia would be feeling less than enamoured with the European Union and all its constituent parts at the moment. And in general, you would be right. Lots of bellicose noise is coming out of Prime Minister Kostunica and company, and there are threats of refusing to work with the EU at all.
Any yet, next week will see a cross-border conference in the middle of Belgrade, organised by the Serbian government, celebrating the Neighbourhood Programmes (“Serbia’s Success Stories”) and looking forward to the new cross-border programmes for 2007-2013. So what’s going on?
In all probability, a number of things. Firstly, a majority of Serbs realise that they do need to keep working with Europe and that they do need to get on with their neighbours, regardless of their disagreements over the future of Kosovo. Secondly, the EU considers that engagement with Serbia remains vital for the region as a whole, and all good news stories must be encouraged (see the EU’s latest Western Balkans Communication from 5 March: ec.europa.eu/enlargement/balkans_communication/index_en.htm); and thirdly, there is a key team of Serbian officials who have been driving the cross-border agenda forward in recent years since they have recognised the potential and added value of this co-operation for their country.
This group of people have a difficult task in the current climate. I wish them well.
Any yet, next week will see a cross-border conference in the middle of Belgrade, organised by the Serbian government, celebrating the Neighbourhood Programmes (“Serbia’s Success Stories”) and looking forward to the new cross-border programmes for 2007-2013. So what’s going on?
In all probability, a number of things. Firstly, a majority of Serbs realise that they do need to keep working with Europe and that they do need to get on with their neighbours, regardless of their disagreements over the future of Kosovo. Secondly, the EU considers that engagement with Serbia remains vital for the region as a whole, and all good news stories must be encouraged (see the EU’s latest Western Balkans Communication from 5 March: ec.europa.eu/enlargement/balkans_communication/index_en.htm); and thirdly, there is a key team of Serbian officials who have been driving the cross-border agenda forward in recent years since they have recognised the potential and added value of this co-operation for their country.
This group of people have a difficult task in the current climate. I wish them well.
Monday, 3 March 2008
The hidden borders of Europe
Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence has sparked off further tensions elsewhere is Europe. Kosovo's supporters claim that Kosovo is a unique case, that the attempted genocide by Serbia in the late 1990s meant Serbia had lost all moral authority, and that Kosovan independence has no impact on frozen conflicts elsewhere in Europe. Russia and Serbia argue the opposite, and even have support from within the European Union, with countries like Spain, Cyprus, Romania and Slovakia all concerned about the precedent being established in Pristina.
In truth, both sides are being disingenuous. A unilateral declaration by a region or province of a country, without that country's consent, could obviously trigger parallel declarations (in fact, other declarations have been made years ago, without the level of recognition that Kosovo has already achieved). Equally, however, the only way something similar could happen in Abkhazia or South Ossetia, for example, is with full Russian backing – so the only way it becomes a precedent in these cases is if Russia wants it to become a precedent.
There are 6 principal areas of concern across Europe where the Kosovo situation is being watched very closely: the already mentioned Abhkazia and South Ossetia; Transnistria; Nagorno Karabakh; Republika Srpska; and northern Cyprus. (For a perspective from further away, see the Sri Lanka news story on the right-hand side.)
The first three cases are linked directly to Moscow – no-one is going to recognise these countries as independent unless Moscow does. Moscow is perfectly happy to keep all three territories hanging since it keeps them dependent, and gives Moscow leverage against Georgia and Moldova.
Nagorno Karabakh is occupied by Armenia; Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh are in positions of power in Yerevan – yet, even Armenia has not recognised Nagorno-Karabakh's declaration of independence. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have been spending very large sums on defence equipment (or, rather, attack equipment) and this is one area where the conflict could unfreeze rapidly.
Northern Cyprus has also declared its independence many years ago, but is recognised only by Turkey. The recent Cypriot presidential elections seem to have opened a possibility of resuming talks on the future of the island, and there are some hopes here. The Cypriot government's strong reaction on Kosovo's declaration is evidently directly linked to concerns that it strengthens the UDI of northern Cyprus. Again, this seems overblown, as no-one else is planning to recognise the UDI.
Republika Srpska is, of course, particularly problematic given the Serbian ethnic links. Demonstrations have already taken place in Banja Luka against Kosovan independence. If Srpska wants to declare independence on the basis of a referendum, how and why would this be different from Kosovo? Territorial integrity must apply to Bosnia, but must not apply to Serbia? This is a fundamental weak link in the argument of those who recognise Kosovan independence.
Of course, one further area where the Kosovan situation has an immediate impact is – northern Kosovo. If the majority population around Mitrovica says that it wants to be part of Serbia, why should Kosovan territorial integrity count for any more than the Serbian equivalent has done? Here, I think, we will actually see something happening in the short term, for the simple reason that Pristina’s writ will be unenforceable north of the Ibar, and Mitrovica et al will continue, de facto, to be linked to Belgrade.
In truth, both sides are being disingenuous. A unilateral declaration by a region or province of a country, without that country's consent, could obviously trigger parallel declarations (in fact, other declarations have been made years ago, without the level of recognition that Kosovo has already achieved). Equally, however, the only way something similar could happen in Abkhazia or South Ossetia, for example, is with full Russian backing – so the only way it becomes a precedent in these cases is if Russia wants it to become a precedent.
There are 6 principal areas of concern across Europe where the Kosovo situation is being watched very closely: the already mentioned Abhkazia and South Ossetia; Transnistria; Nagorno Karabakh; Republika Srpska; and northern Cyprus. (For a perspective from further away, see the Sri Lanka news story on the right-hand side.)
The first three cases are linked directly to Moscow – no-one is going to recognise these countries as independent unless Moscow does. Moscow is perfectly happy to keep all three territories hanging since it keeps them dependent, and gives Moscow leverage against Georgia and Moldova.
Nagorno Karabakh is occupied by Armenia; Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh are in positions of power in Yerevan – yet, even Armenia has not recognised Nagorno-Karabakh's declaration of independence. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have been spending very large sums on defence equipment (or, rather, attack equipment) and this is one area where the conflict could unfreeze rapidly.
Northern Cyprus has also declared its independence many years ago, but is recognised only by Turkey. The recent Cypriot presidential elections seem to have opened a possibility of resuming talks on the future of the island, and there are some hopes here. The Cypriot government's strong reaction on Kosovo's declaration is evidently directly linked to concerns that it strengthens the UDI of northern Cyprus. Again, this seems overblown, as no-one else is planning to recognise the UDI.
Republika Srpska is, of course, particularly problematic given the Serbian ethnic links. Demonstrations have already taken place in Banja Luka against Kosovan independence. If Srpska wants to declare independence on the basis of a referendum, how and why would this be different from Kosovo? Territorial integrity must apply to Bosnia, but must not apply to Serbia? This is a fundamental weak link in the argument of those who recognise Kosovan independence.
Of course, one further area where the Kosovan situation has an immediate impact is – northern Kosovo. If the majority population around Mitrovica says that it wants to be part of Serbia, why should Kosovan territorial integrity count for any more than the Serbian equivalent has done? Here, I think, we will actually see something happening in the short term, for the simple reason that Pristina’s writ will be unenforceable north of the Ibar, and Mitrovica et al will continue, de facto, to be linked to Belgrade.
Tuesday, 26 February 2008
New borders, no borders
One of the results of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence is the creation of a number of new borders in the Western Balkans – or so say some. On the other hand, Serbia and Russia claim that no new borders have been created, since the declaration was illegal and does not create a new state.
Of course, the debate is not being presented in terms of the number of borders created or not, but that is one of the effects, and it is worth looking at the impact this could have. Macedonia's northern border is split in two, half Kosovar, half Serbian. The Serbian border with Albania becomes a Kosovo-Albania border entirely; and even the border with Montenegro is affected, with a short stretch now being between Kosovo and Montenegro. All of this is without even mentioning the long Serbia-Kosovo border which is now in de facto existence – not withstanding the rapid Serbian efforts to burn down some of the border posts.
Given this blog's focus on cross-border co-operation issues, what are the possibilities of encouraging such activity on these "new" borders? Well, it is clear that the very opposite of co-operation is going to happen along the Serbia-Kosovo border for the foreseeable future. But what of the others? It is likely that Albania and Kosovo will be keen to work together fairly quickly, but perhaps the most complicated case of all could be the Macedonian border. Macedonia, already suffering political issues on its southern border (this blog considers a country can call itself what it wants, so we will not be using the "former Yugoslav Republic…" terminology), will now face real problems on its northern borders. It will be keen to work with Serbia on the one hand, while especially the ethnic Albanian population will want to work with Kosovo. However, working with Kosovo could well lead to sanctions or boycotts from Serbia, thus undermining both possible co-operations.
Evidently, cross-border co-operation is not the first thing in peoples' minds at the moment. Nevertheless, the benefits of such contacts should not be underestimated in helping to reduce tensions in such difficult situations. Therefore, it is probably worth watching how events develop in the short to medium-term, and then taking careful steps to start cross-border links where possible.
Of course, the debate is not being presented in terms of the number of borders created or not, but that is one of the effects, and it is worth looking at the impact this could have. Macedonia's northern border is split in two, half Kosovar, half Serbian. The Serbian border with Albania becomes a Kosovo-Albania border entirely; and even the border with Montenegro is affected, with a short stretch now being between Kosovo and Montenegro. All of this is without even mentioning the long Serbia-Kosovo border which is now in de facto existence – not withstanding the rapid Serbian efforts to burn down some of the border posts.
Given this blog's focus on cross-border co-operation issues, what are the possibilities of encouraging such activity on these "new" borders? Well, it is clear that the very opposite of co-operation is going to happen along the Serbia-Kosovo border for the foreseeable future. But what of the others? It is likely that Albania and Kosovo will be keen to work together fairly quickly, but perhaps the most complicated case of all could be the Macedonian border. Macedonia, already suffering political issues on its southern border (this blog considers a country can call itself what it wants, so we will not be using the "former Yugoslav Republic…" terminology), will now face real problems on its northern borders. It will be keen to work with Serbia on the one hand, while especially the ethnic Albanian population will want to work with Kosovo. However, working with Kosovo could well lead to sanctions or boycotts from Serbia, thus undermining both possible co-operations.
Evidently, cross-border co-operation is not the first thing in peoples' minds at the moment. Nevertheless, the benefits of such contacts should not be underestimated in helping to reduce tensions in such difficult situations. Therefore, it is probably worth watching how events develop in the short to medium-term, and then taking careful steps to start cross-border links where possible.
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